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ABSTRACT

In 1965 Congress passed the Ocean Research Vessel Act (ORVA)
with

the

purpose

of

oceanographic studies.
11

scientific personnel

encouraging

the

nation's

efforts

in

Section 4 of the ORVA states that
on an oceanographic

research vessel

shall not be considered seamen under the provisions of title
53 of the Revised Statutes ...

11

•

interpretation of this wording,

As a result of a literal
the Courts have ruled that

scientific personnel are excluded from the beneficial remedies
afforded all other seamen under the Jones Act.

Some courts

have also denied an injured scientist "seaman status" under
the general maritime law.
never

intended

protection

of

to
the

This paper argues that Congress

exclude
Jones

scientists

Act,

and

from

that

the

this

statutory

inequitable

circumstance has arisen due to faulty interpretation of the
ORVA's legislative history.

Scientists on research vessels

work in a hazardous environment.

They are exposed to the

"perils of the sea" to the same degree as all other blue water
seamen.

The paper calls for Congressional re-evaluation of

the ORVA, with the .purpose of amending Section 4, in order to
clarify its original meaning and ensure an injured scientist
the same remedies afforded all seamen.
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PREFACE

On a sunny Wednesday afternoon in mid-June, my computer and
printer were both humming, churning out what I hoped would
be the final draft of this paper.
paper, perhaps very good.

I felt it was a good

I had researched the Ocean

Research Vessel Act of 1965 and all subsequent court
decisions which referenced that law. An inequity seemed to
exist.

Compared to their shipmates, scientists aboard

research vessels are at a considerable disadvantage

with

respect to legal remedies available in case of personal
injury.

In addition, the legislative history of the Act did

not seem to support the judicial outcome.

While the number

of persons who were affected by this inequity was not large,
the issue was significant for those who were so affected,
and therefore seemed worthy of consideration.

I put the paper into the proper format, packaged it up, and
prepared to submit it.

Only hours before I dropped the

envelope in the mail, I learned that the United States
Supreme Court had handed down a new decision on a "seaman's
status" case.

Interesting I thought.

I was quite surprised

that a "seaman status" case had made it up to the Supreme
Court without my having unearthed it.
ORVA seaman status case.

But it was not an

I didn't imagine that it would
i

significantly impact the paper which I had just completed. I
was extremely interested in reading the decision, but that
would have to wait.

My bags were already packed and I was

on my way to Alaska, where I was scheduled to take command
of a small research vessel for the summer 1 •

Upon my return from sea, I anxiously called my advisor to
inquire what his reaction to my paper had been.

I was

extremely disheartened to learn that the Court's June seaman
status decision was a far reaching one which might have
considerable impact on my conclusions.

The paper would have

been acceptable except for that decision handed down the
same day that the paper was completed.

He suggested I get a

copy of the decision, study it, and then get back to him.

I immediately logged on to the Internet, and downloaded a
copy of the Court reporter's syllabus for the decision.

It

would be a few more days before I could get a copy of the
full opinion.

I could tell from the syllabus, however,

that the Court had used this case as a forum to elaborate on
the broad issue of standards a maritime worker must meet in
order to attain that valued classification known as
''seaman's status."

The case in question was a Jones Act

suit brought by a superintendent engineer injured while

1

The author is a licensed Master
specializes in research vessel operation.
ii

Mariner

who

working aboard a cruise ship. 2

The vessel was not a

research vessel, and the injured employee was not a
scientist.

The decision in this case, however, was a

statement by the Court on the broader question of seaman
status for all maritime workers.

After careful consideration of the decision and the
concurring opinion in Chandris v. Latsis,

I feel that the

arguments presented and the conclusions drawn in this work
remain valid.

The paper which follows has been re-written,

where necessary, in order to incorporate the new
jurisprudence on "seaman status", as elaborated by the
Supreme Court in June.

The decision in Chandris may well have a major impact on
"seaman status" cases.
will tell.

It is likely to do so.

Only time

The Chandris decision may be a turning point in

the Court's general direction on Jones Act "seaman status"
cases which has been evident for over half a century, since
the enactment of the Jones Act.

The Court's decision may

serve to limit those maritime workers eligible for such
"status."

If so, certainly some scientists will be affected

by the Chandris decision.

Under the Chandris rule alone,

some scientists probably would fail to qualify for "seaman
status", and thereby Jones Act applicability.
2

But not all

Chandris v. Latsis, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 4047,
iii

*

will be so affected.

Some oceanographic scientists and

technicians will pass the Chandris test, and yet still be
denied Jones Act protection due to the decisional law
pertaining to the ORVA.

Therefore, in the wake of the Supreme Court's Chandris
decision, the inequity outlined in this paper still exists.
It is likely that fewer sea-going scientists will be denied
the valuable "seaman status" classification under the ORVA
jurisprudence because some will already be disqualified from
such status due to failure to meet the Chandris test.

But

for scientists who do meet the Chandris test, the inequity
will now be even greater.

The conclusions found in this

paper still stand. An inequity exists due to judicial
misinterpretation of Congressional intent in enacting the
ORVA.

lV

I. INTRODUCTION

Sea-going is a dangerous enterprise.

Seamen confront the

perils of the sea -- the power and whim of wind, wave and
tide.

The missions of water-borne ventures often require

voyages of great distance, far from safe refuge, depriving
seamen of the facilities, support and comfort of home .
Society has long recognized the hardships and dangers faced
by seamen.

As early as Medieval times, the ancient sea

codes provided seamen the right of "maintenance and cure''
for illness and injuries sustained at sea. 1

In the United

States the law has long afforded greater remedy for seamen
than for land based workers. 2

Three basic remedies are available to an injured seaman
under present United States law.

Two are maintained under

the general maritime law: the right to "maintenance and
cure" and the right to maintain an action against a vessel
or shipowner for injuries caused by breach of the warranty
of seaworthiness. 3 The third is a statutory right,
available since 1920, to bring suit for injuries sustained,
1

Gilmore and Black, The Law of Admiralty, 2d Edition,
Mineola: The Foundation Press, 1975 @ 281; Also see J. Sims,
The American law of maritime personal injury and death: An
historical review. 55 Tul. L. Rev. 973, @974- 977 (June 1981)
2

Frank 1. Maraist, Admiralty in a Nutshell 2d Edition.
St. Paul:West Publishing Co. 1988 , p.175
3

The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903)
1

against a negligent employer under the provisions of the
Jones Act. 4

The right to maintain an action under any of

the above doctrines depends upon the injured wo+ker's
status, i.e. whether he or she can be classified as a
"seaman".

Therefore, a great body of litigation and case

law has developed over the issue of "seaman status".

In 1965 Congress enacted the Ocean Research Vessel Act
(ORVA)

5

,

intended to encourage oceanographic research by

removing several restrictions on research vessels which
previously had hampered the nation's expansion in the marine
sciences. 6 Prior to the enactment of this law, research
vessels were required to be inspected as either passenger
vessels or cargo vessels.

The operators of such vessels

maintained that regulatory requirements for passenger and
cargo vessels were not appropriate for the special
construction and operation of research vessels. 7

One of

4

46 U.S.C.A. § 688. The Jones Act is the common name for
a section of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 which established
an employers liability to an injured seaman caused by the
negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of the
employer.
5

0cean Research Vessel Act of 1965, 46 U.S.C.A.

§§

441-

445
6

Senate, Commerce Committee, Exemption of oceanographic
research vessels from certain inspection laws: Purpose of the
bill. 89th Congress, 1st session, 1965, S.R. 168.
7

see
United
States
House
of
Representatives,
Oceanographic Research Vessel Exemption: Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Oceanography of the Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries. 89th Congress, 1st session, No.89-8, May
2

the problems faced by the research vessel operators was that
scientific personnel had to be classified as either
passengers or crew.

Vessels were only permitted to carry a

limited number of passengers before being required to meet
the

comprehensive safety standards for passenger carrying

vessels, with which few research vessels could comply. 8

On

the other hand, if considered members of the crew,
scientists were required to apply for, and obtain, Merchant
Mariner's documents from the United States Coast Guard
(USCG) .

This was seen as an inefficient requirement which

was both costly and time consuming.

The method chosen by Congress to grant the relief sought by
research vessel operators 9 was to declare that:
Sec. 2 - "An oceanographic research vessel shall not be
considered a passenger vessel ... " 10
and
4,5, 1965.

9

It is worth noting that not only was oceanographic
research deemed to be in the public interest, but at that
time, most research vessels operating in the United States
were either owned or supported by the federal government.
Even today, when there is a larger commercial research vessel
industry, the United States government maintains operational
and/or financial control over a fleet of over 60 vessels.
Philip A. Sacks, "The changing environment for the federal
research vessel fleet: Where lies the future?"
Unpublished
paper, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, 1995.
10

46 U.S.C.A. § 442. Repealed 1983 by P.L.
contained in 46 U.S.C.A. § 3302
3

98-89,

now

Sec. 4 - " Scientific personnel on an oceanographic
research vessel shall not be considered seamen under
the provisions of title 53 of the Revised Statutes and
Act[sic] amendatory thereof or supplementary
thereto. " 11
The language in section 4 is vague, and does not clearly
define what provisions of title 53 Congress had been
concerned with.

The Courts have taken a very broad reading

of section 4, interpreting it literally, while holding in
several cases that Congress intended to broadly exclude
sc i entists from seaman status.

The jurisprudence has

produced an inequitable result which is regrettable.
Scientists on research vessels are now excluded from the
right to seek remedy under the statutory provisions of the
Jones Act and the Death on the High Seas Act (DOSHA) , which
have been ruled by the courts to be supplementary to title
53.

Scientists have in most courts maintained their

remedies as seamen under the general maritime law, but in
some courts even these protections are jeopardized. 1 2

The

result is unfortunate on several counts .

Scientists on ORVs are blue water seamen who face the
"perils of the sea" to the same degree, if not greater, than
most crew members today who are employed in the more
11

46 U.S.C.A.

12

Craig v. M/V Peacock 760 F. 2d 953

§

444

4

"traditional" seaman's positions.

Except for scientists,

who, as a result of misinterpretation of the ambiguities
found in section 4 of the ORVA13 have been excluded "seaman
status" for several important remedies,

the courts have

been expanding the application of "seaman status" to include
all other blue water sailors who in the course of their
employment are regularly exposed to the hazards of the
sea. 14

Due to the fact that scientists are excluded from important
federal protections afforded injured seamen, they are often
forced to seek relief from state workers' compensation
13

Instructors and students on Sailing School Vessels were
similarly also exempted by Congress in the Sailing School
Vessel Act of 1982, a law modeled after the ORVA, with a
similar purpose of granting relief from passenger vessel
regulations deemed inappropriate for vessels of a specialty
class.
46 U.S.C.A § 446
14

In June of this year, the Supreme Court spoke to the
issue of "seaman status" in Chandris v. Latsis, 1995 U.S.
LEXIS 4047, *: a Jones Act suit involving a superintendent
engineer injured while working on a cruise ship.
In its
Chandris decision the Court seems to have reversed its general
trend of expanding applicability of Jones Act coverage through
seaman's status decisions which has been evident since the
passage of the Act in 1920. However, the ruling in Chandris
establishes only the minimum temporal connection with the
vessel in order to distinguish a sea-going maritime worker
from a land-based maritime employee.
The Chandris decision
does nothing to alter the Court's 1991 decision in McDermott
International v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 112, which very clearly
expands "seaman status" applicability to any employee doing
the "ships work. " In fact, in Chandris the Court continues to
hold that: "The Jones Act is reserved for sea-based maritime
employees whose work regularly exposes them to the special
hazards and disadvantages to which those who go down to the
sea in ships are exposed. " (Quoting Seas Shipping Co. V.
Sieracki, 328 U.S. at 104, 1946, Stone, C. dissenting.)
5

statutes.

This serves to undermine the longstanding policy

of maintaining uniformity and consistency within the federal
maritime law.

In addition, further inequity can result from

the differences in applicability and relief provided by the
compensation laws of the various states.

It is the purpose of this paper to examine this inequitable
result.

To ask why, two persons, perhaps the bosun and a

scientist,

working side by side on the aft deck of an ORV

may, if injured, have very different remedies available to
them, depending upon the determination of their respective
"seaman status''?
into

The remainder of this paper is divided

six sections.

In the next, the three basic remedies

available to seamen: maintenance and cure, unseaworthiness,
and the Jones Act, are discussed in more detail.

The third

section reviews the history of the jurisprudence on "seaman
status" in general.

Then follows a review of the Ocean

Research Vessel Act, including a close examination of the
legislative history, in an attempt to determine Congress'
purpose in enacting the law, and whether it intended to
seve~ely

limit the remedies available to an injured

scientist.

The case law which has resulted from court

interpretation of the "seaman status" of scientists is
outlined in section V.

An analysis and discussion follows

in section VI, in which the paper argues that the courts
have misinterpreted the legislative history concerning
6

Congressional intent in the ORVA.

The paper finds only one

reference to the Jones Act in the entire record of the
legislative hearings on the bill, and holds that the
reference to "seaman status" and title 53 of the Revised
Statutes intended only to exempt scientists from the
requirement to carry Merchant Mariners Documents, not to
exclude scientists from coverage under the Jones Act.

The

paper finds no policy justification for the result that has
ensued, where an individual class of blue-water workers is
singularly denied the beneficial remedies afforded all other
"seamen".

In the concluding section, two options are

suggested to rectify the inequity which now exists.

The

first is for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari of an
ORVA "seaman's status" case in order to re-analyze the
legislative history.

Although it is unlikely that the Court

will express an interest in such a narrow area of the
maritime law, it has shown an interest in "seaman status"
cases over the last few years, and may choose to hear a case
in order to reconcile the differences between the Circuits
in their ORVA decisions .

It could give the Court an

opportunity to elaborate the "seaman status" test started in
1991 15 and further defined this year in the case of

Chandris v. Latsis 16 , if it feels additional elaboration is
necessary.

The second, and more likely solution suggested

15

McDermott International v. Wilander

16

115 S.

Ct. 2172

(1995)
7

498 U.S.

112

is for Congress to recognize the mischief which has been
done with ambiguities in section 4 of the ORVA, and to amend
the law in order to clarify its original intent, and
overrule the jurisprudence which has led to the inequity.

II. REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO SEAMEN

Maintenance and cure

The right to maintenance and cure is the only remedy
available to seamen which is ancient in origin. 17

It was a

recognized right of seamen even before the American
Revolution, when a seaman who was wounded, maimed or fell
ill in service to the ship was entitled to maintenance and
cure at the expense of the vessel . 18

Maintenance and cure

in the United States is a right created under the general
maritime law, first mentioned by Justice Story in 1823. 19
Courts have since recognized maintenance and cure as an
obligation of the vessel to a sick or injured seaman

a

right which could only be lost if the injury resulted from
the seaman's willful misconduct.

Even though this seaman's

remedy was long recognized, precise definition concerning

17

Sims, supra @ 973

18

Id.

@

978

19

Harden v. Gordon 11 F.
Schoenbaum, supra. @ 159

Cas.
8

480

(1823),

cited by T.

the extent of the right developed through case law slowly.
A seaman is now considered "in service to his ship" if he is
subject to call by the vessel. 2 0

Maintenance refers to the

seaman's right to room and board while receiving medical
treatment.

The courts have held that the seaman under

treatment is entitled to the value of room and board he was
receiving onboard the ship, 21 which has been held in modern
times to be anywhere between eight and thirty dollars per
day. 22

"Cure" is the right to necessary medical treatment,

but the ship's duty only continues until the seaman is cured
or has reached the point of maximum recovery. 23

The

injured seaman is also entitled to unearned wages until the
end of the voyage . 24

The vessel's obligation to provide

maintenance and cure is without regard to fault.

Neither

negligence nor causation is relevant 25 , therefore
maintenance and cure have been described as a type of nofault health insurance.

In order to be entitled to the

right of maintenance and cure the injured worker must
20

rd. @ 979, citing The Bouker No. 2, 241 F. 831 (Second
Circuit 1917)

22

D.
Nixon,
"Recent developments in U.S. commercial
17 J. Mar. L.
fishing vessel safety, insurance, and law."
Com. 359, 364 (1986) .
23

Schoenbaum, supra. ,
States, 336 U.S. 511
24

Id.

@

@

161,

160

9

citing Farrell v .

United

qualify as a "seaman. " 26

The injured worker's employer 27 ,

is liable in personam for the expenses of maintenance and
cure, and the vessel may also be liable in rem.

Sick and

injured seamen formerly received free medical care at Public
Health Service hospitals, at U.S. government expense, until
these facilities were closed in 1981. 28

The Osceola

Before the twentieth century, the American law of maritime
personal injury and death was narrow in scope and nearly
static. 29

In this century however, it has become a dynamic

and complex aspect of the law, as Congress and the Courts
have sought to create "new remedies to meet the social,

26

According to Schoenbaum: "The legal test for seaman
status for purposes of maintenance and cure is the same as
that established for determining status under the Jones Act."
supra. @ 160.
See however, section V infra, the test of
"seaman status" for scientists is now different under the
general maritime law and the Jones Act. Sennett v. Shell Oil
Company, 325 F. Supp. 1 (D. New Orleans 1971).
27

Tradi tionally the "seaman's" employer was the shipowner.
In recent years, however, the nature of the maritime industry,
and the employer/ employee relationship between sea-going
workers and the ship owner has been changing. In the offshore
oil industry, for example, many workers may be working aboard
a vessel for an employer other than the shipowner. The same
is true in the oceanographic research field.
Scientists
aboard research vessels may be employees of the shipowner, but
often are not.
It is not uncommon to have groups of
scientists with various different employers, possibly from
several states or even foreign countries, working together on
the same vessel.
28

Nixon, supra.

29

Sims, supra.

@
@

364.
973.
10

economic and human needs resulting from ever-expanding
maritime operations.

1130

In 1903, the Supreme Court

summarized seamen's remedies available under American law.
In the landmark case of The Osceola 31 , the Court held that:
the law may be considered settled on the following
propositions:
1. That the vessel and her owners are liable, in case a
seaman falls sick, or is wounded, in the service of the
ship, to the extent of his maintenance and cure, and to
his wages, at least so long as the voyage is continued.

2. That the vessel and her owner are, both by English
and American law, liable to an indemnity for injuries
received by a seaman in consequence of the
unseaworthiness of the ship, or a failure to supply and
keep in order the proper appliances appurtenant to the
ship.
3. That all the members of the crew, except perhaps,
the master, are, as between themselves, fellow
servants, and hence seamen cannot recover for injuries
sustained through the negligence of another member of
the crew beyond the expense of his maintenance and
cure.
4. That the seaman is not allowed to recover an
30Id.
31

189 U.S. 158 (1903).
11

indemnity for the negligence of the master, or any
member of the crew, but is entitled to maintenance and
cure, whether the injuries were received by negligence
or accident. 32

The Court's opinion in Osceola consolidated maintenance and
cure jurisprudence, and clarified the long recognized duty
of a ship owner to provide a seaworthy vessel for the crew
by declaring the seaman's right to indemnity for injuries
sustained as a result of unseaworthiness.

Significantly,

the Court also declared that the general maritime law
contained no right for a seaman to maintain a negligence
action for injuries sustained.

Only the Osceola's first

proposition, concerning the vessel's and shipowner's duty to
provide maintenance and cure, has stood the test of time. 33
The other three have been either abrogated or substantially
modified by the Courts and by Congress, with the changes in
most cases expanding not only the type of remedy available
for the protection of an injured seaman, but also the types
of maritime workers who could be classified as eligible to
maintain a

11

seaman's 11 action . 34

32

Id.

33

Sims, supra

@

175.
@

984.

34

A significant exception to this trend was Congress' 1972
action which overruled earlier court trends which extended
seaman's status to shorebased maritime workers who performed
the work normally done by seamen. In amending the Longshore
and Harborworkers Compensation Act (LHWCA), however, Congress
12

Unseaworthiness

The shipowner's duty to provide a seaman with a seaworthy
vessel is greater
others.

than the seaworthiness duty owed to

A vessel seaworthy for a crewman has been defined

as one which is "reasonably fit for [its]

intended use" . 35

Because seamen live and work on the vessel, the concept of
"seaworthiness" means a place reasonably fit to both live
and work. 36

The obligation of the shipowner to provide a
It has therefore been

seaworthy vessel is absolute.

described as a warranty. However, it is not contractual but
imposed by tort law as a consequence of the seaman's
relationship to the vessel. 37

It is a difficult task to

determine when a work area for a hazardous occupation is
reasonably fit for its intended use, and the courts have not
established a precise formula for application. 38

In its

well cited opinion in Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., the
Supreme Court defined the ship operator's obligation in the
following way:
What has been said is not to suggest that the owner is
obligated to furnish an accident free ship.

The duty

extended another federal remedy to the workers who it was
denying seaman status. 33 U.S.C. 901 et. sec.
35

Mitchell v. Trawler Racer,

36

Maraist, supra.

38

Id.

@

@

196.

197.
13

Inc., 362 U.S. 539

(1960)

is absolute, but it is a duty only to furnish a vessel
and appurtenances reasonably fit for their intended
use.

The standard is not perfection, but reasonable

fitness; not a ship that will weather every conceivable
storm or withstand every imaginable peril of the sea,
but a vessel reasonably suitable for her intended
'
service
... 39

An unseaworthy condition can be both temporary and
transitory. 40

To establish unseaworthiness, it is not

required that the owner had an opportunity to remedy the
unseaworthy condition, nor that he was even aware of its
existence. 41
port. 42

It may arise after the vessel has left

The duty of seaworthiness is absolute and does not

depend upon a ship owner's negligence. 4 3

Unseaworthiness

and negligence were originally considered to be distinctly
separate concepts, with unseaworthiness restricted to the
structure of the ship and its appurtenances, and negligence
arising only from error in the direction and control of
operations aboard ship. 44

In its 1944 opinion in Mahnich

39

362 U.S. 539 (1960).

43

Schoenbaum, supra.

44

Sims, supra.

@

@

166.

985.
14

v. Southern Steamship Company1 5 , the Supreme Court muddied

this distinction, finding a vessel unseaworthy as a result
of the mate's operational error in selection of a faulty
rope.

The Court's trend to broaden the concept of

unseaworthiness continued until its apparent reversal of
direction in 1971, finding that an "isolated personal
negligent act " 46 did not render the vessel unseaworthy . 47

The duty of seaworthiness is owed by the vessel operator.
Often the operator is the seaman's employer.

However, in

the changing environment of shipping and other maritime
ventures, the seaman may be working for an employer other
than the vessel operator. 4 8

In this case, the seaman is

still owed the duty of seaworthiness by the operator.

Under

a demise charter, the operator becomes the owner pro hac
vice and assumes the obligation to provide a seaworthy

vessel. 49

Negligence

The third and fourth propositions of The Osceola establish a

45

46

321 U.S. 96

Usner
(1971) .

v.

(1944).

Luckenbach

47

Sims, supra.

48

See n. 25 supra.

49

Maraist, supra .

@

Overseas

986.

@

198
15

Corp. ,

400

U.S.

494

single rule.

Namely, that seamen could not recover damages

for injuries caused by negligent actions of the master or a
fellow crew member. 50

The seaman's union was not satisfied

with this ·limitation on compensation, and advocated for
change.

Congress first attempted to overrule the Supreme

Court's Osceola decision, with the passage of the Merchant
Seaman's Act of 1915, which provided in section 20, that
seamen having command shall not be considered fellow
servants of those under their authority. 51

Three years

later, the Court declared that Congress has missed the mark
with the 1915 Act, in its (Congress') belief that the
"fellow servant" doctrine was what barred seamen's recovery
for negligence.
Co. 52 ,

In Chelentis v. Luckenbach Steamship

the Court held that it was not the "fellow servant"

rule contained in proposition three of Osceola, but the
fourth proposition, denying recovery for injuries sustained
due to the negligence of the master or a member of the crew,
which barred the seaman's recovery. 53
Chelentis was a fireman aboard the steamship J.L. Luckenbach
whose leg was broken when he was knocked down by a wave.
received due care immediately, entered the marine hospital
on arrival in New York, but eventually his leg required
50

Sims, supra.

51

38 Stat .1164,

52

247 U.S. 372 (1918).

53

Sims, supra.
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He

amputation.

The seaman filed an action asserting that the

injury resulted from the negligence and an improvident order
In the complaint, the seaworthiness

of a superior officer.

of the vessel was not questioned and no claim was made for
In affirming summary judgement

maintenance and cure.

denying Chelentis a negligence action, the Supreme Court
mooted Congress' 1915 efforts, holding:
The language of the section disclose no intention to
impose upon shipowners the same measure of liability
for injuries suffered by the crew while at sea as the
common law prescribes for employers in respect of their
employees ashore. s4

Congress quickly responded to the Court's challenge, passing
the Jones Act in 1920, which established the right to
recover damages for injury to, or death of, a seaman arising
from the negligence of the owner, master, or fellow crew
member.ss

The method chosen by Congress to grant a remedy

to seamen for injury caused by negligence was to extend the
applicability of the Federal Employer's Liability Acts 6
(FELA).

The law established the seaman's right to trial by

jury and eliminated contributory negligence as a defense. 57
54Id.

u.s.c.

@
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56

45 U.S.C.

@

51 et. seq.

57

Sims, supra.,

s 5 46

@
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The defendant in a Jones Act suit is the seaman's employer,
which may or may not be the vessel owner. 58

The Jones Act

gives the seaman the option to bring suit in federal
admiralty jurisdiction or to file his claim at law with
right to a jury trial in either state or federal court.
Actions filed in state court are not removable.

The Jones Act was used as the principal tool for asserting
seaman's personal injury and death claims from the time of
its passage until 1950.

Since then, unseaworthiness claims

have gained in importance because of the more liberal
interpretation of the concept of seaworthiness, with the
Jones Act being used to obtain trial by jury. 59

Wrongful death

Historically, under common law and the English Admiralty
doctrine, no duty was owed the survivors of a deceased
seaman other than the payment of wages and the return of his
effects. 60

In 1886, the Supreme Court ruled that:

... it is now established that in the courts of the
United States no action can be maintained for
wrongful death]

[a

in the absence of a statute giving the

right ... [and] we are forced to the conclusion that no
58

See supra note 25.

s9Id.
60

Sims, supra@ 1004.
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such action will lie in the courts of the United States
under the general maritime law. 61
Congress and the Court allowed state wrongful death statutes
to fill the void created by the lack of a federal remedy
until 1920 when Congress granted wrongful death and
survivors actions to survivors of seamen 62 , with the Jones
Act provision which extended FELA applicability to seaman.
In the same year, Congress passed the Death on the High Seas
Act 63 (DOHSA) , which provides a cause of action for the
death of any person caused by wrongful act, neglect, or
default more than three miles from shore. 64

A deceased

seaman's survivors may seek remedy under both the Jones Act
and DOSHA.

The Supreme Court addressed a number of

anomalies in the remedies available for wrongful death at
sea with its 1970 Moragne 65 opinion which overruled The

Harrisburg6 6 , finding a wrongful death action within the
general maritime law.

The current U.S. law concerning wrongful death at sea is
generally regarded as a strange and confusing array of
61

The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886).

62

Maraist, supra@ 279.

63

46

64

Schoenbaum, supra

65

Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375.

66

119 U.S. 199 (1886).

u.s.c.
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761-768.
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remedies, depending upon a complex interplay of a decedent's
"status", the "situs", or location of death, and the
instrumentality involved --vessel, platform, or aircraft. 67
A seaman's survivors now may maintain an action for wrongful
death under several federal statutes, under the general
maritime law, and in some instances under state wrongful
death statutes.

Interaction between remedies in seamen's injury cases

There is considerable overlap between the damages awardable
under the doctrines of maintenance and cure,
unseaworthiness, and the Jones Act.

Double damages are not

allowed, and any awards received under a claim for one of
the above stated remedies will reduce an award for the same
Double damages are not a

injury granted under another.

problem, because unseaworthiness and Jones Act negligence
claims arising out of the same injury must be joined. 6 8
Because an unseaworthiness action arises out of the general
maritime law, and the Jones Act claim does not, some
elements of damages may be recoverable under one but not the
other. 6 9

Punitive damages are not available under the

Jones Act, but may be awarded in an unseaworthiness

67

Sims, supra

68

Maraist, supra

@

1008.
@
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69Id.
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claim 7 0 •

Loss of society (consortium) can also be awarded

under the general maritime law but is not available under
the statutory provisions of the Jones Act. 71

Damages

recoverable under both the Jones Act and the general
maritime law of unseaworthiness include:
1 . Pre-judgement loss of wages sustained by the injured
party;
2. loss of future wage earning capacity;
3. past and future costs of medical care and any other

economic loss incurred;
4. physical pain and suffering; and

5. mental anguish and anxiety. 72

With the expansion of the applicability of the doctrine of
unseaworthiness since 1950, much of the distinction between
a Jones Act claim and an unseaworthiness action have been
erased.

Nevertheless, practitioners will always file a

Jones Act claim whenever it is remotely available because it
establishes the right to trial by jury, and maintenance and
cure and unseaworthiness cases can be joined and also heard
by the jury.

It is well accepted that a jury is more likely

to award greater damages to an injured worker than a

?old.
71

Schoenbaum, supra @ 187

72

Id. @ 186.
21

judge. 7 3

Additionally, the Jones Act claim remains

important to an injured seaman, because it is still possible
for a worker to be injured on a vessel found to be
seaworthy74 ,

in which case a negligence claim against the

employer may be the only remedy available in addition to
perhaps meager damages awarded under maintenance and cure.

Workmen's compensation

Remedies available to injured land-based workers are
generally found within the workmen's compensation system of
the state in which the injured worker is employed.

In

workmen's compensation systems employers accept a type of
strict liability for all injuries sustained by workers in
their employ.

In exchange for acceptance of this "no-fault"

arrangement, the amount of damages awarded are limited and
fixed by law, thereby protecting the employer from unlimited
liability for a worker's injuries.

Each state has its own

workmen's compensation system with its own governing laws
and award levels.

Workmen's compensation is generally deemed to be mutually
exclusive from damages awarded to an injured seaman under

73

Nixon, supra @ 367.

74

Usner v . Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U . S. 494 (1971).
22

the Jones Act. 75

In 1917, in the landmark decision of

Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,

76

the Supreme Court ruled

that a state could not constitutionally apply its workers'
compensation system to a worker injured on a vessel upon
navigable waters.

The Court concluded that in the interest

of uniformity of the nation's maritime law, state laws
concerning workers' injuries could not be effective on
navigable waters.

A "twilight zone" was thereby created,

which included persons injured while working on vessels, but
who could not be considered seamen.

In order to rectify the

situation, where certain workers could find themselves
without remedy in case of injury, Congress first attempted
to extend applicability of state workmen's compensation laws
to non-seamen injured on navigable waters.

This too was

struck down by the Supreme Court as an unconstitutional
delegation of the federal legislative power. 77

The Court

did permit the application of state workmen's compensation
statutes in certain instances if injuries sustained by a
worker on navigable waters were deemed to be "maritime but
local " 78 • In 1926 the Court ruled that a maritime worker
75

See Benders v. Board of Governors for Higher Education,
636 A.2d 1313 (R.I. 1994); and Decourt v. Beckman Instruments,
Inc., 32 Cal. App.3d 628 (C.A. Cal. 4th Appellate Dist., Div.
11973).
76

244 U.S. 205 (1917).

77

Maraist, supra

@

223.

78

Id. citing Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co.
U.S. 469 (1922).
23

v.

Rhode,

257

performing work aboard a vessel normally done by a member of
the crew could be considered a Jones Act seaman. 79
Congress reacted to this by passing the Longshoremen's and
Harborworkers Compensation Act 80 (LHWCA) in 1927, which
created a federal workers' compensation system for landbased
maritime workers injured upon navigable waters, and for the
most part eliminated the "twilight zone" of overlapping
and/or vanishing remedies for certain classes of injured
workers.

The LHWCA has since been amended to extend

coverage inland of the waters edge and to specifically
include additional maritime workers, further defining the
line between maritime workers who should receive awards for
injuries under a no-fault workmen's compensation type
system, and seamen, who because of the hazards faced by
their exposure to the perils of the sea, are awarded the
more generous beneficial remedies of the Jones Act and the
general maritime law.

III. "SEAMAN STATUS"

- THE RIGHT TO SEAMEN'S REMEDIES

"In recognition of their exposure to the physical and
psychological hazards of their distinctly maritime high risk

79

International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty,
(1926).
80

33

u. S. C. A.

§§

9O1 et seq.
24

272 U.S. 50

environment, seamen are afforded special protections under
the United States maritime law. " 81

The right to maintain a

claim under any of the special protections outlined in the
previous section 82 depends upon determination that an
injured worker is a seaman. 83

As a result, most

litigation over damages awarded for injury or death to a
maritime worker have involved the question of "seaman
status".

A huge body of case law exists on the subject.

The courts have been involved with the issue for the last
sixty years, struggling to establish and apply sensible
criteria for determining "seaman status.

11 8 4

The Supreme Court broke its silence on the issue of "seaman

8 1D.

status .

Robertson, A new approach to
64 Texas L. Rev. 79,80 (1985).

determining

seaman

82

Except DOSHA which provides an action for wrongful death
by any person, not just seamen.
However, courts have
interpreted sect i on 4 of the ORVA as precluding scientists
from seamen status for DOSHA application , which prevents a
decedent scientist's "personal representative" from asserting
an unseaworthiness claim under DOSHA, an action available to
the survivors of seamen. see Schoenbaum, supra@ 237, note 9.
83

An action under DOHSA is available to all persons, not
only seamen.
Some courts have extended interpretation of
section 4 of the ORVA to exclude a scientist from "seaman
status" under DOHSA as well as the Jones Act.
In cases such
as this however, the decedent scientists survivors should
still be able to maintain a non-seaman's wrongful death action
under DOSHA.
84

Robertson, supra

@

83.
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status" in 1991 85 , after having allowed the Circuits to
create the law in this area for over three decades. 8 6

Even

after the Court's decision in McDermott International v.
Wilander, we were far from having a bright line rule
available for guidance with respect to seaman status.
Wilander,

In

the Court did little to provide policy guidance to

clarify the complex and confusing body of law pertaining to
remedies for seamen's injuries.

The Court responded again

earlier this year. In its decision in the case of Chandris
v. Latsis 87 , the Court attempts to set a policy
justification for the Jones Act and the determination of
seaman status.

How well the Chandris decision clarifies the

ambiguities and simplifies the determination of "seaman
status" in practice will only be seen over time.

The problem with respect to the "seaman status" of
scientists aboard research vessels is but a small part of
this much larger issue concerning the public policy inherent
in the existence of generous beneficial remedies for those
85

McDermott International v. Wilander 498 U . S. 112 (1991);
Bach v. Trident Steamship Co . 920 F. 2d 322 (Fifth Circuit
1991), cert. granted and judgement vacated; Southwest Marine,
Inc. v. Gizoni 112 S.Ct. 486.
86

The courts last hearing of a "seaman's status" case
previous to Wilander was in its Butler v. Whitemen opinion reaffirming that determination of "seaman status" in a Jones Act
suit is a question for the jury . 356 U.S. 271 (1958).
87

115 S. Ct. 21 72
26

workers who regularly face the perils of the sea, and the
determination of the proper extent of applicability of those
regulations through the definition of the term "seaman".
Even the Chandris Court, in its attempt to define the policy
justification behind the Jones Act, still speaks favorably
of this justification for sea-based maritime employees whose
work regularly exposes them to the special hazards of the
sea. 88

Early seaman status decisions

The earliest Admiralty law concept restricted seamen's
remedies to those who could "hand, reef, and steer. " 89

The

narrowest rule was that a seaman must actually navigate, but
throughout the nineteenth century, the "federal courts
consistently awarded seamen's benefits to those whose work
on board ship did not direct the vessel.

Firemen,

engineers, carpenters and cooks were all considered
seamen.

1190

As early as 1832 a cooper on a whaling vessel

was held to be a seaman. 91

In United States v. Thompson,

Justice Story, sitting on circuit, held that "[a] cook and

88

1995

u. s. LEXIS 4047
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89

Fugleberg, infra citing The Canton 5 F. Cas. 29, 30 (D.
Mass. 1858).
90

McDermott
(1991).

International

91

v.

28 F. Cas. 102 (No.16,492)
Wilander, 498 U.S. 112 (1991).
27

Wilander,
(CCD

498

Mass.),

U.S.
cited

112
in

steward are seamen in the sense of the maritime law,
although they have peculiar duties assigned them.

So a

pilot, a surgeon, a ship carpenter, and a boatswain are
deemed seamen, entitled to sue in the admiralty.

1192

By

1850, the noted scholar Benedict wrote in The American
Admiralty:
... all the persons who have been necessarily or
properly employed in a vessel as co-laborers to the
great purpose of the voyage, have, by the law, been
clothed with the legal rights of mariners -- no matter
what might be their sex, character, station or
profession. 93
In 1882 a requirement that an injured worker have aided in
navigation was explicitly rejected by Judge Learned Hand in
awarding seamen's benefits to a bartender. 94

Seaman status and the Jones Act

The Jones Act creates a cause of action in favor of
"any seaman" who suffers personal injury or death in
the course of his employment.

The benefits of the Act,

however, are available only to a "seaman". Thus, to be
admitted into the charmed circle of seamen is of

93

E. Benedict, The American Admiralty, Sec. 241, pp.13334. cited in Wilander, 498 U.S. 112 (1991).
94

The Minna, 11 Fed. 759, 760 (E.D. Mich . 1882), cited in
Wilander, id.
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special importance to the plaintiff . 95

Unfortunately, the Act does not provide a definition of the
term, and at the time of its enactment, neither had the
courts provided any clear definition. 96

Early Court

rulings after passage of the Jones Act used a very expansive
definition of the term "seaman. " 97

In International

Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty9 8 the Court set the early
pattern, upholding Jones Act coverage for a longshoreman
injured while working during unloading operations aboard a
vessel located upon navigable waters.

In 1927, in response to earlier Court rulings that
application of state worker's compensation statutes on
navigable waters violated constitutional requirements for a
uniform federal maritime law, Congress enacted the Longshore
and Harborworkers Compensation Act

(LHWCA) . 99

This law

established a federal worker's compensation system for
maritime workers, specifically excluding the ''master or
member of a crew of any vessel" . 100
95

Schoenbaum, supra

96

Robertson,

@

1 73.

supra@ 85.

97Id.
98

272 U.S. 50

99
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The question then

arose if the federal compensation systems provided by the
Jones Act and the LHWCA were mutually exclusive . 101

Early

Court holdings on the issue proved equivocal 102 , but the
issue was resolved with the opinion in Swanson v. Marra

Brothers 103 , holding that Congress intended the Jones Act
and the LHWCA systems to be mutually exclusive . 104

The

Jones Act term "any seaman" and the LHWCA term "master or
member of the crew of any vessel" are now deemed to be
synonymous. 105

In fact,

the courts have recently begun

using the LHWCA term for determination of seaman status in
Jones Act suits, prompting some commentators to reflect on
the irony, of a term used in one law receiving its
definition in another . 106

In Wilander the Supreme Court

concluded that the Jones Act and the LHWCA are mutually
exclusive and the "key requirement for Jones Act coverage
now appears in another statute."

1 01

Robertson, supra

@

86.

1 02

see Robertson, supra, note 37, citing Norton v. Warner
Co., 321 U.S. 565 (1944); South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v.
Bassett, 309 U.S. 251 (1940); Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155
(1934);
Nogueira v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 281 U.S. 128
(1930).
103

328 U.S. 1 (1946).

104

Robertson, supra

@

86.
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N. Fugleberg, McDermott International v. Wilander:
Seaman status revisited. 27 New Eng. L. Rev. 1017,1032.
30

The Supreme Court's decisions in the middle part of this
century provide only general guidance as to who qualifies as
a member of a vessel's crew. 107
Dock Co.

v.

In South Chicago Coal

&

Bassett 108 the Court sustained LHWCA coverage,

thereby denying Jones Act "seaman status", for a barge
worker whose main duties involved facilitating the flow of
coal from a lighter, and who did not participate in the
navigation of the vessel. 109

The court also found that

determination of seaman's status is ordinarily a question of
fact. 110

In Norton v. Warner Co. 111 , distinguishing the

injured worker from Basset, the Court held that seaman
status and remedy in admiralty existed for a worker who
performed maintenance on a barge.

In Norton the Court

recognized it as important that the worker "had the
permanent attachment to the vessel which commonly
characterizes crew." 112
Desper v.

The Court denied seaman status in

Starved Rock Ferry Co. 113 to a worker who was

injured while doing maintenance on a vessel laid up for the
season, despite the fact that he was a member of the
107 Robert son, supra,

86 .

@

108 309 U.S. 251 (1940).
109 Robertson, supra

@

86.

110 Robertson, supra@ 87.
111 327 U.S. 565 (1944).
112Id.
113 342 U.S. 187 (1952).
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operational crew when the vessel was in service,

concluding

that one aspect of the test for seaman's status required the
vessel to be in navigation.

In Senko v. Lacrosse Dredging

Corp. 114 the Court heard the case of an injured worker who,
as a handyman on a dredge anchored in navigable waters,
slept home at night and had never been aboard when the
dredge had been moved.

In finding the plaintiff a Jones Act

seaman, the Senko decision clearly negates any requirement
that a seaman be aboard the vessel primarily in aid of
navigation. 115

The Court also re-established that the

status issue is to be decided by a jury except in the
clearest of cases. 116

In these, and several per curiam decisions handed down in
the 1950s 117 ,

the Court failed to provide clear direction

on the question of status, preferring to offer only general
guidance on the issue. 118

Robertson,

in a 1985 article

entitled "A New Approach to Determining Seaman Status"
writes that the Court had been criticized for its failure to

114

3 5 2 u . s . 3 7 0 ( 19 5 2 ) .

115
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supra
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Texas Co. v. Gianfala, 222 F.2d 382 (5th Cir.), rev'd
per curiam, 350 U.S. 879 (1955); Grimes v. Raymond Concrete
Pile Co.,
356 U.S.
252
(1958) (per curiam)
Butler v.
Whitemen356 U.S. 271 (1958) (per curiam).
118

Robertson,

supra
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discuss the policies supporting special protections for
seamen. 11 9

Robertson, however, found a policy perception

clearly at work, and summarized it in the following way:
. . . the two policies at work in the seaman status cases
are, first the protection of the benevolent seamen's
remedies to those who confront the characteristic
seamen's hazards and, second, confining other maritime
and amphibious workers to alternative remedial
systems. 12 0 121

The Fifth Circuit

Offshore v.Robison

In 1959, the Fifth Circuit attempted to consolidate seaman
status jurisprudence.

In Offshore v. Robison 122 seaman

status was upheld for a roustabout assigned to a jack-up rig
who was injured at a time when the platform was immobile.
In dicta, Judge Wisdom's opinion pointed to the need to
protect workers who are exposed to the characteristic
seamen's dangers as a central policy reference. 1 23

The

Robison test for seaman status relies on a two prong consideration:

121

see section VI infra.
It is the contention of this
paper that the above policy goals are generally at work in the
11
seaman status 11 jurisprudence, but that both have been ignored
in fashioning the law concerning remedies available to
scientists on research vessels.
1 22

266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959)

123

Robertson, supra

@
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[T]here is an evidentiary basis for a Jones Act case to
go to the jury :

(1) if there is evidence that the

injured workman was assigned permanently to a vessel
(including special purpose structures not usually
employed as a means of transport by water but designed
to float on water) or performed a substantial part of
his work on the vessel; and (2) if the capacity in
which he was employed or the duties which he performed
contributed to the function of the vessel or to the
accomplishment of its mission, or to the operation or
welfare of the vessel in terms of its maintenance
during its movement or during anchorage for its future
trips. 124
It is clear that under the Robison test, scientists on
research vessels have the necessary connection to a vessel,
and perform duties which contribute to the accomplishment of
the vessel's mission.

Therefore, except for the statutory

exclusion that has been interpreted as contained within the
ORVA, scientists would be afforded the same beneficial
remedies as their "crew member" shipmates.

The Fifth Circuit hears most seamen status cases, and the

Robison formula has been widely adopted by the other
circuits, although not unanimously so.

The Seventh Circuit

held in 1984, in Johnson v. John F. Beasely Construction
124

0ffshore v. Robison,

supra
34

@

779.

Co., that an injured worker's duties must make a
"significant contribution to the maintenance, operation or
welfare to the transportation function of the vessel. " 125
The Fifth Circuit, however, continued to construct its more
expansive policy on seaman status in several subsequent
cases.

In 1984, the same year in which the Seventh Circuit

decided the Johnson case, the Fifth handed down its decision
in Wallace v. Oceaneering International, rejecting the
narrower Johnson approach while upholding a Robison type
analysis. In affirming judgement on a jury verdict for the
plaintiff, a diver seriously hurt during a deep water dive,
the court stated that:
[I]n ambiguous cases, our analysis again and again has
focused on (1) the degree of exposure to the hazards or
perils of the sea, and (2) the maritime or terra firma
nature of the workers duties.
[and]
[T]he seaman status of Wallace is established by his
exposure to maritime perils with regularity and
continuity, and the maritime nature of his primary
duties. 126
Two years later, in its Barrett v. Chevron U.S.A.,

Inc. 127

125

1054

Johnson v. John F. Beasely Construction Co., 742 F. 2d
(7th Cir. 1984).

126

727 F.2d 427,434

127

752 F.2d 129,

(5th Cir. 1984).

rev'd on rehearing

bane)
35

(5th Cir.

1986) (en

decision, the Fifth Circuit again reaffirmed its support of
the Robison doctrine.

A strong majority, in an en bane

decision showed firm commitment to Robison.

The Supreme Court re-evaluates seaman status

In 1991 the Supreme Court decided to end its thirty-three
year silence on the issue, agreeing to hear three seaman
status cases.

The Court accepted certiorari to resolve the

difference between the circuits, and announced in its
decision in McDermott International v. Wilander1 28 that the
Fifth Circuit's Robison test would hold over the Seventh's

Beasely formula.

It can be seen then that the Court, after

years of allowing the circuits to establish policy on the
seaman status issue, , has decided that the more expansive
Robison type approach -- with an inherent policy reacting
favorably to workers who face the perils of the sea
should now be the law of the land.

After extending seaman

status and the concomitant beneficial remedies to workers
who face the perils of the sea, the second part of the
policy theme has been to restrict other maritime and
amphibious workers to alternative remedies.

Both of the

above policy forces helped to shape the Wilander
decision. 129
12 8

4 98

u. s . 112 ( 19 91 ) .

129

J. Kavanaugh, Jr. and D. Plunkett, Recent develooment:
McDermott International, Inc. v. Wilander: Robison revisited -The "aid-in-navigation" test walks the plank. 65 Tul.L. Rev.
36

The Wilander decision firmly established that a maritime
worker did not have to be involved in the navigation of the
vessel to be considered a seaman.

Doing the ship's work is

enough to qualify the worker for "seaman status".

The

Wilander court spoke only to the nature of the maritime
worker's duties,

the second prong of the "seaman status"

test established by the Robison court.

Earlier this year, the Supreme Court used the Jones Act suit
of Antonios Latsis against his employer Chandris, Inc. to
speak to the first prong of the Robison test.

While the

second prong pertains to the nature of the work performed,
the first prong of Robison deals with the required temporal
connection with the vessel (or fleet of vessels) .

In

Chandris, the Court found that the various temporal
requirements used to establish "seaman status" by the
circuits varied little. 13 0

The Court saw no substantive

difference between the traditional test which required a
"more or less permanent connection" with the vessel and the
Robison formulation which requires a "substantial" portion
of the employee's work be carried out aboard the vessel. 13 1

Within its analysis the Court discerned "the essential
1747 52
I

130

(1991) •
1995 U.S. LEXIS 4047

@
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contours of the 'employment-related connection to a vessel
in navigation. ' " 132
"

It held that

a seaman must have a connection to a vessel in

navigation (or to an identifiable group of such
vessels) that is substantial in terms of both its
duration and its nature. The fundamental purpose of
this substantial connection requirement is to give full
effect to the remedial scheme created by Congress and
to separate the sea-based maritime employees who are
entitled to Jones Act protection those land-based
workers who have only a transitory or sporadic
connection to a vessel in navigation, and therefore
whose employment does not regularly expose them to the
perils of the sea. " 133
The Court went even further in actually establishing a
quantitative guideline for the percentage of an employee's
working time which should be aboard ship to qualify him for
"seaman status."
11

It relied heavily on the history of

seaman status" determinations of the Fifth Circuit, noting

with approval that the appeals court " ... has declined to
find seaman status where the employee spends less than 30
percent of his time aboard ship.

132

id.
U.S. @355.

quoting McDermott

133

id.

@

*40

134

id.

@
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International v.

38

Wilander 498

Therefore, as of the Chandris decision, the court has
created a two pronged test for "seaman status."

To qualify,

a maritime employee's duties must "contribute to the
function of the vessel or the accomplishment of its mission"
and the "seaman must have a connection to a vessel

(or an

identifiable group of such vessels) that is substantial in
both its duration and its nature.

11135

The Sieracki Seaman

In another line of cases, dating to its 1946 decision in the
case of Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki 136 , the Supreme Court
extended seaman's status to longshoremen exerting
unseaworthiness actions against the shipowner for injury
incurred aboard a vessel in navigable waters.

In his

dissent to the majority opinion in Sieracki, Justice Stone
wrote that it was exposure to the "perils of the sea" and
the risks attending the movement of vessels on navigable
waters which distinguish a seaman's work. 137

Congress

overruled Sieracki, with an amendment to the LHWCA which
excluded maritime workers covered under the Act from
asserting a seaman's unseaworthiness action against a
shipowner, while at the same time broadening protection

135

id.

136

328 U.S.

@

*40
85

( 1946) ;

rehearing denied,

(1946) .
137

Id., cited by Robinson, supra
39

@

80.

328 U.S.

878

provided by the Act to injuries occurring on piers, docks,
and other inland harbor areas.

Here, in Congress' workings,

its policy can be discerned: A policy which includes
seaman's remedies for those who perform a substantial
portion of their work aboard vessels, and who are regularly
exposed to the perils of the sea, but denies them to others.
Congress did not deem harborworkers so exposed, and thus the
1972 amendments.

However, Congress did not take away the

Sieracki seaman's unseaworthiness remedy without providing
an alternate remedy, i.e. extending the application of the
LHWCA to a more inclusive group of maritime workers over a
more expansive qualifying

11

situs 11

•

138

The dual policy is

clear: Seamen's remedies for those who face the perils of
the sea, and an alternate remedy for other maritime workers.
It will be shown in the following sections, therefore, that
it is illogical to interpret the ambiguous wording of
section 4 of the ORVA as having intended to repudiate both
of these policies as far as scientists are concerned; i.e.
remove protection from blue water sailors exposed to the
perils of the sea, while offering no alternative remedy.

It has been shown in this section that seaman status
determines access to the remedies provided by both the Jones
Act and maintenance and cure, and in most cases the duty of

13 8

Sims, supra

@

9 94.
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the warranty of seaworthiness. 139

According to Schoenbaum:

The warranty of seaworthiness is a powerful doctrine,
but it is a duty owed to a narrow class of maritime
workers -- those who can claim "seaman" status under
the law. Other persons who come aboard a vessel, such
as passengers, visitors, and even scientists who serve
on an oceanographic research vessel (emphasis added) ,

are not seamen and cannot claim the benefit of the
warranty. 140

The next section of the paper reviews the Ocean Research
Vessel Act of 1972 (ORVA), and the pertinent legislative
history, in order to determine on what policy consideration
Congress might have based its actions in the passage of the
Act -- provisions of which have been construed by the courts
as intended to limit the application of seamen's status
within a legal environment that has generally been extending
such status to most similar maritime workers.

In fact,

the

current state of the law, while still without a bright line
test for seaman status, has clarified the distinction of
remedies available to harborworkers and seamen.

Although

some difficulties still arise concerning the status of
inshore maritime workers (brown water seamen) , for blue

139

Schoenbaum, supra @ 1 73.

140

Id.@ 170., citing Craig v. M/V Peacock, 760 F.2d 953
(9th Cir. 1985).
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water sailors, those who are regularly exposed to the perils
of the sea, the issue seems well settled.

Blue water

employees falling within the Robison/ Wilander/Chandris
decisions are seamen.

Except, that is, for scientists on

research vessels, 141 who are excluded from many of the
protections the availability of seaman's status provides.

IV. THE OCEAN RESEARCH VESSEL ACT OF 1965

The Problem

In 1965 Congress passed the Ocean Research Vessel Act (ORVA)
with the purpose of promoting oceanographic studies. 142
Previous to the passage of the ORVA, research vessels were
required to be inspected either as passenger or
miscellaneous cargo vessels.

The regulations likewise

offered only two possible classifications for scientists.
They could be considered either passengers or members of the
crew. If more than a small number of scientists were listed
as passengers, then the vessel had no alternative than to be
designated as a passenger vessel, and thereby be required to

141

Also excepting instructors on Sailing School Vessels,
who, as scientists on ORVs, are precluded from the remedies
according to provisions in the SSVA, a law modeled in several
important ways after the ORVA.
142

see generally Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Oceanography, House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee,
88th Congress, 1st session, Serial No. 89-8, May 4,5 1965.
42

meet the stringent and comprehensive construction and
operational standards which apply to passenger carrying
vessels.

Most research vessels at that time were

conversions of cargo and work vessels which could not
easily, if at all, comply with passenger vessel standards.
In addition, it was felt by the research vessel operators
that construction and operational standards for either
passenger or cargo vessels were not appropriate for the
working mission of research vessels, and even when
compliance was feasible, it was at some compromise to the
scientific mission.

The U.S. Coast Guard, the federal agency responsible for
vessel inspection and operational safety, was sympathetic
with the problems confronting the research vessel operators,
and interpreted regulations as flexibly as the law allowed.
Scientists were permitted by the Coast Guard to be signed
onto the vessel's roster as members of the crew.

This

required, however, that each scientist apply for and receive
a Merchant Mariner's document, an identification and rating
card carried by all seamen.

The manning regulations only

allowed approximately one third of the seamen to be unrated
''ordinary seamen" .

Therefore, if too many scientists were

signed onto the ship's roster as members of the crew, some
could be required to obtain an "able seaman's" rating
process which required first establishing qualification
43

a

through extensive sea service, and then demonstrating
proficiency through examination.
and unnecessary requirements.

These were seen as onerous

The research vessel operators

considered it time consuming and costly. 143

Scientists

might be forced to travel long distances in order to find a
Coast Guard licensing off ice authorized to issue the
documents.

In 1962 a group of research vessel operators, mostly from
university and non-profit research institutions, organized
an industry group known as the Research Vessel Operators
Council

(RVOC) .

This group decided to approach Congress

with the hope of finding relief from the regulatory corner
they found themselves in.

It should be noted that almost

all of the funding for the vessels operated by the members
of the RVOC came from federal sources, primarily the Navy
and the National Science Foundation (NSF) .

Therefore it is

not surprising that these, and all other agencies involved
in marine studies were completely supportive of some measure
of relief.

The Coast Guard supported a change in the

shipping laws which would allow it to treat research vessels
more favorably.

In addition, during the 1960s the nation's

interest in the oceans was growing.

Funding for

oceanographic studies was expanding rapidly.

143

Id. @ 49 . Position
submitted into testimony.

paper
44

prepared

The cold war

by

the

RVOC,

was at its peak, and it was deemed a national priority to
maintain a leadership position concerning knowledge about
the oceans . 144

This could be accomplished only with a

concerted program in oceanographic research, which,
according to many of those involved, was severely hampered
by the inappropriate classification, manning, and inspection
regulations being applied to research vessels.

The stage

was well set for a receptive ear in Congress to the research
vessel operators' concerns.

The legislative history

The problem faced by research vessel operators had been
under study by the concerned federal agencies since
1962. 145

The Research Vessel Operators Council submitted a

proposed bill for consideration by both Houses of the 88th
Congress.

S. 2552 was reported favorably by the Senate

Commerce Committee 146 but died when the House failed to
take action on it.
S.627~ 7

Congress as

144

Id.
from Mass.
145

@

It was re-introduced in the 89th
in the Senate and H.R.3419 and

10. See statement of Hon. Hastings Keith, Rep.

Hearings, supra
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1.

U. s. Senate,
Exemption of oceanographic vessels from
vessel inspection laws. Report No .1276, 88th Congress, 2d
Session, July 31, 1964.
146

U. s.
Senate,
Exemption of oceanographic research
vessels from certain inspection laws. Report No. 168, 89th
Congress, 1st session, April 28 1965.
147

45

H.R.7320 in the House. 148

Hearings were held by the

Subcommittee on Oceanography of the House Merchant Marine
and Fisheries Committee (SOHMMFC) on May 4 & 5, 1965.

The

bill passed the floor of the House on July 12, 1965, the
floor of the Senate one week later, and was enacted as the
Ocean Research Vessel Act of 1965 149 •

The purpose of the Act was:
... to encourage and facilitate oceanographic research
and to remove several restrictions which have hampered
the expansion of research in the marine sciences.

This

will be accomplished by exempting oceanographic
research vessels from the application of certain vessel
inspection laws. 150
The bill was presented as a remedial action in the public
interest. 151 The goal was to get more scientists to sea.
In the original draft, the applicability was to be only for
RVs operated by non-profit or educational institutions, or
state or local governments.

In the 88th Congress the bill

was amended, broadening its application to all vessels
operated "in the public interest."

Still, even this phrase

148

U. S. House of Representatives, Merchant Marine
Fisheries Committee, Report No. 599, July 7, 1965.
149

Public Law 89-99: 46 U.S.C. §441-445.

150

Senate Report No. 89-168.

151

Hearings, supra @66.
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and

generated considerable debate, particularly from a
contingent of private research vessel operators because the
Coast Guard testified that it interpreted the term "in the
public interest "to exclude certain commercial research
operations . 152

In the end, the bill was amended again,

treating all research vessels employed "exclusively in
instruction in oceanography or limnology or both, or
exclusively in oceanographic research ... " 153

--

whether

commercial or non-profit -- equally.

The law as enacted is less than one page long, and contains
five sections. The full text of the Act reads as follows:

(1) the term "oceanographic research vessel "
means a vessel which the Secretary of the department in
which the Coast Guard is operating finds is being
employed exclusively in instruction in oceanography or
limnology, or both, or exclusively in oceanographic
research, including, but not limited to, such studies
pertaining to the sea as seismic, gravity meter and
magnetic exploration and other marine geophysical or
geological surveys, atmospheric research, and
biological research;
(2) the term "scientific personnel" means persons
152

Hearings, supra.
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who are aboard a vessel solely for the purpose of
engaging in scientific research, instructing, or
receiving instruction, in oceanography or limnology.
Sec. 2. An oceanographic research vessel shall not
be considered a passenger vessel, a vessel carrying
passengers, or a passenger-carrying vessel under the
provisions of the laws relating to the inspection and
manning of merchant vessels by reason of the carriage
of scientific personnel.
Sec. 3. An oceanographic research vessel shall not
be deemed to be engaged in trade or commerce.
Sec. 4. Scientific personnel on an oceanographic
research vessel shall not be considered seamen under
the provisions of title 53 of the Revised Statutes and
Act amendatory thereof or supplementary thereto.
Sec 5.

If the Secretary of the department in

which the Coast Guard is operating determines that the
application to any oceanographic research vessel of any
provision of title 52 or 53 of the Revised Statutes, or
Acts amendatory thereto, is not necessary in the
performance of the mission of the vessel, he may .by
regulation exempt such vessel from such provision, upon
such terms and conditions as he may specify. 154

Congress thereby granted the following relief to the
154

Public Law 89-98, July 30, 1965; 79 Stat. 424.
48

operators of research vessels:

RVs would not be deemed to

be passenger vessels and the scientists would therefore not
be passengers. Sec. 5 authorizes the Coast Guard to exempt
research vessels from any shipping regulations which it
deems unnecessary. Section 4 declares that scientific
personnel will not be considered seamen under title 53.

It

is unclear what Congress really intended to accomplish with
the wording in section 4 .

It is ambiguous.

The Courts have

found in Section 4 that it was Congress' intent to exclude
scientific personnel from the protection of the Jones Act.
A close reading of the legislative history does not support
such a conclusion. 15 5

The hearing held by the OSHMMFC

spanned two days, and in print, covers some 71 pages.

There

is only one reference to the Jones Act in the entire
hearings, made by D.W . Pritchard, in which he mistakenly
attributes the requirement to provide medical care to sick
and injured seamen to the Jones Act, as opposed to the
doctrine of maintenance and cure. 156

Nowhere in the

testimony, has reference been found,

to any intent to

exclude scientists from seaman status for Jones Act
protection.

On the other hand, however, there is ample

155

See Judge Gibson's analysis of the legislative history
of the ORVA in his opinion in Presley v. M/V Caribbean Seal,
537 F.Supp. 956 (S.D . Texas 1982), partially rev'd.
1 56

Testimony of D.W. Pritchard, member, National Academy
of Sciences; chairman, Dept. of Oceanography, Johns Hopkins
University; Director, Chesapeake Bay Institute, Hearings,
supra .
49

evidence in the record of the hearings that Congress was
concerned about avoiding inequitable treatment.

For

example, Congressman Lennon, in discussing possible
reduction in standards for living quarters for seamen under
the Act stated:
We can't let discrimination get into this document.

We

must not have that, even among seamen. 157
While Cong. Lennon was not referring to scientists at the
time, it does express the sentiment that unfair or unequal
treatment had no place in the ORVA.

Considerable discussion took place, and testimony presented,
concerning adding an amendment to the bill which would have
made it clear that crew members on RVs would be eligible for
free medical treatment at public health service hospitals, a
right of all merchant seamen and even fisherman.

This

amendment failed to carry due to concern that it would meet
opposition in another committee, purely on a financial
basis. 158

The record is clear however that the

Oceanography Subcommittee supported the amendment, and was
loathe to discriminate at all in the bill.

Absent any intent to discriminate against scientists with
respect to seamen's protections afforded by the Jones Act,
157Hearings, supra
158Id.

@

@

56.
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the question then arises what did Congress intend in Sec. 4.
The answer can be found in the following statement of Cmdr.
William Benkert, Assistant Chief, Merchant Vessel Inspection
Division, the senior Coast Guard officer testifying at the
hearings:
The elimination of scientific personnel from seaman
status will remove them from statute applicability
involving obtainment of merchant mariner documents and
other related requirements which were not initially
contemplated for this type of personnel. 159
A more reasonable interpretation of Sec. 4 of the ORVA, one
that is consistent with the testimony presented at the
hearings, is that it was intended only to eliminate the
statutory requirement that scientists carry merchant
mariner's documents.

At the time of the enactment of the ORVA, most commercial
fishermen were not required to carry merchant mariner's
documents but did have seaman status for Jones Act
applicability . 160

Testimony provided at the hearings

pointed out the similarity between scientists on research
vessels and commercial fisherman.

Dr. Leland Hawthorne,

Director of the National Science Foundation, testified:

159

Hearings, supra.
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°For a discussion of remedies available to fishermen,
see Nixon, supra.
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Fishing vessels are an excellent example; in many
respects they are similar to oceanographic research
vessels.

They carry complements of fishermen who, like

the scientists on oceanographic vessels, are engaged in
the primary mission of their vessels but are not
necessarily part of the crew.

Such vessels have been

set apart from merchant vessels in the regulations
regarding mann i ng, inspection, and documentation.

It

has become increasingly evident that research vessels
should also be set apart from the usual vessels that
ply the sea. 1 6 1
In similar testimony by John Dermody, Principal
Oceanographer, Dept of Oceanography, University of
Washington, scientists on research vessels were compared to:
... fishermen, whalers , and salvage crews ... who, like
the scientific crew on a research vessel, are engaged
in the primary mission of the vessel but are not
necessarily part of the operating crew.

Vessels of

these three categories have been set apart from
merchant vessels in the regulations regarding manning,
inspection, and documentation. 1 62
Each of these classes of shipboard workers, while receiving
special consideration for manning, inspection, and
documentation purposes, still are fully protected by all of
161

Hearings, supra

162
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the beneficial remedies available to seamen, including the
Jones Act.

It can be clearly seen that the intent of those seeking the
regulatory relief viewed scientists on research vessels as
similar to fishermen, and deemed regulatory treatment
similar to fishermen appropriate for scientific personnel.
As mentioned above, fishermen while exempt from certain
manning and merchant mariner documentation requirements, had
all of the remedies available to the traditional seamen.
Certainly fishermen face the perils of the sea every bit as
much as any other group of blue-water sailors. 163

In fact

the work done by scientific personnel on research vessels is
quite similar to that performed by fisherman.
often working close to the rail of the vessel

Both are
(thereby in

great danger of falling overboard) , deploying and retrieving
equipment, often heavy and unwieldy, on small, often
unstable vessels, in all weather.

Scientists are exposed to

the dangers of working near winches and cables in the same
way fishermen are.

In his testimony to the Committee, Stanford T. Crapo,
President, Marine Acoustical Services, Inc., stated:
... the members of the scientific party aboard are aware
of the perils of the sea and are prepared to accept
16 3

Nixon, supra@ 372.
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their exposure to them as a condition of their
employment, in exactly the same manner as do the
crewmembers of ships of all types. 164
It can be seen that supporters of the bill understood the
dangers faced by scientists, and expected them to be
considered as similar to crewmembers as opposed to
passengers.

In all of the above cited testimony, as well as the entire
record of the Congressional hearings, it is evident that the
intent of the interested parties seeking the passage of the
ORVA was to modify the regulations regarding manning,
inspection, and documentation.

Never was it contemplated

that scientists on research vessels, exposed to the perils
of the sea, every much the same as all other blue-water
sailors, would be denied the special protections afforded
seamen.

It is also clear from the testimony, which

recognizes scientists as involved in the primary mission of
the vessel, that except for the current court interpretation
of Sec. 4, based upon an erroneous reading of the
legislative history, scientists would be considered seamen
for Jones Act applicability, and properly afforded such a
remedy.

164

Hearings, supra
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V. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE ORVA

Sennett v. Shell Oil Company

The first case which forced court interpretation of the ORVA
came six years after its enactment in Sennett v. Shell Oil
Company1 65 ,

still the most cited decision in cases

involving injured scientists.

Albert Sennett was an

employee of Shell Oil Company, who was killed when "a
defective seismic air gun misfired and blew off the right
side of his head.

11166

Sennett's widow and children filed

suit against Shell under the provisions of the Jones Act,
DOHSA, General Maritime Law and the Louisiana Civil
Code. 167

Shell argued that because the worker was hired in

Louisiana, and because all other remedies were foreclosed by
the ORVA, the sole remedy available was under the Louisiana
Workmen's Compensation Law.

The court turned to the

legislative history of the Act to find the answer.

Not

before stating, however, that:
It would be a strange result if one who labors on the
high seas may recover against his employer only under

165

325 F. Supp 1 (D. New Orleans 1971).

166

Id. @ 3. This graphic description of Albert Sennett's
death taken from Judge Rubin's decision clearly underscores
the hazards to which scientific personnel on research vessels
are exposed.
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state compensation laws for an industrial accident. 168

In the legislative history the court found that the law:
... does not, with respect to either their traditional
maritime crew or their scientific personnel, change the
provisions of general maritime law.

It does not

provide any compensation scheme with respect to
industrial accidents to scientific personnel although
Congress clearly had the power to do so.

And it

neither says nor implies that scientific personnel
shall have the protection of the statutes of each of
the fifty states depending upon where each made his
contract of employment. 169

The court also found that:
The O.R.V. Law does not in terms remove scientific
personnel from seaman's status under either the general
maritime law or the Jones Act. It provides merely that
they are not considered seamen under Title 53 of the
Revised Statutes "and Act

(sic) amendatory thereof or

supplementary thereto. 11 170
Judge Rubin did not find plaintiff's arguments persuasive
that "because the Jones Act is neither a part of Title 53
16s id.
169 Id.

@

4.

17o id.
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nor expressly mentioned in the O.R.V . Law it should remain
fully applicable to 0. R. V. 's. " 171

He held that the Act

excluded Sennet's survivors from maintaining an action under
the statutory provisions of the Jones Act or DOSHA . The
opinion upheld Sennet's seaman status under the general
maritime law however, and citing Moragne v. States Marine
Lines 1 72 found Sennet's survivors had a right to sue for
wrongful death under the general maritime law.

The Sennet decision therefore established the precedent that
the ORVA excludes scientific personnel aboard ORVs from
bringing suit under the statutory protections afforded
"seamen" in the Jones Act, while maintaining their right to
"seaman status" and remedies available under the general
maritime law.

Castro v. Vessel Lafeyette 173

In 1978, seven years after the Sennett decision, the Houston
Division of the Southern District Court of Texas, heard the
case of Basilio T. Castro, who brought suit against the
v essel, and his employers (neither the vessel's owners or
operators)

1 72

for injuries sustained aboard the RV LAFAYETTE,

398 U.S. 375
U.S. 199 (1886).

(1970).

Overruled The Harrisburg,

1 73

Civil Action No.
7 6 -H755
(S.D.
Division, Slip Opinion, March 2, 1 9 78)
57

Texas,

119

Houston

during the course of his employment. The court found the
ORVA applicable, as the LAFAYETTE was a research vessel, and
Castro was "scientific personnel" under the meaning of the
Act.

In a slip opinion, the court affirmed summary

judgement for the defendant employers.

The court cited

Sennett in finding that plaintiff was barred from a Jones
Act remedy, but went even further, holding that the ORVA
precluded Castro from asserting seaman status under the
general maritime law as well.

Delahoussey v. Western Geophysical 174

In the year following the Castro decision, another District
Court considered a case brought by an injured scientist.
Leo Delahousey filed an action against Western Geophysical,
his employer for over eleven years, and the owner of the six
vessels plaintiff had worked on during that period.
Delahoussey claimed he had suffered noise-induced hearing
loss due to excessive noise at his workplace aboard the
vessels which thereby constituted an unseaworthy condition.
No Jones Act action was filed, only an action for
unseaworthiness under the general maritime law.

The court

cited both Robison and Sennett in upholding Delahousey's
status as a seamen while awarding damages for the injuries

174

Delahoussey v. Western Geophysical Company and the M/V
WESTERN CREST, WESTERN REEF, WESTERN GULF, WESTERN BEACON,
WESTERN CAY, and WESTERN GEOPHYSICAL II,
476 F. Supp. 54,
Civil Action No. S76 -365 (N), (S.D. Miss., June 29, 1979).
58

sustained due to defendant's failure to provide a seaworthy
vessel upon which plaintiff could perform his duties.

Presley v. Caribbean Seal 175

In 1982, yet another district court, the fourth to do so,
had the opportunity to comment on Congressional intent in
enacting the ORVA.

James Presley was a compressor mechanic

who, during the course of his employment aboard the RV
Caribbean Seal, was injured when his arm became entangled in

a piece of operating machinery. He brought suit for
negligence under the Jones Act and for unseaworthiness under
the general maritime law.

Judge Gibson of the U.S. District

Court of Southern Texas, Galveston Division, took a
different reading on the legislative history of the ORVA
than judges in the districts previously to have considered
the issue.

He determined that Congress had not "envisioned

the exclusion of scientific personnel from consideration as
seamen for purposes of the Jones Act and the general
maritime law. " 17 6

Judge Gibson found "an inherent tension in the Sennett
opinion" 177

with its (Sennett's) finding that scientific

175

709 F.2d 406 (Fifth Circuit, 1983) cert denied;
Supp. 956 (1982)
Civil Action No. G-81-56 (S.D.
Galveston Division, April 26, 1982).
176

5 3 7 F. Supp. 9 5 6, 9 6 0 ( S. D. Texas 19 8 2) .

177

Id.
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537 F.
Texas,

personnel, could be considered seamen under the general
maritime law while at the same time non-seamen under the
statutory provisions of the Jones Act.

Gibson on the other

hand, after a detailed review of the ORVA legislative
history, found that "a narrower construction of the statute
[was] required. " 178
He noted that
The Research Vessel Operators Council, which logically
would seem to have been the group most concerned with
liability under the Jones Act and general maritime law,
expressed dissatisfaction only with licensing and
manning provisions. 179

Judge Gibson denied summary judgement for the defendant,
holding that the ORVA does not preclude scientific personnel
from maintaining an action under either the Jones Act or the
general maritime law.

He wrote:

Nor does the legislative history of the ORVA, on
balance, support the defendant's contention that
scientific personnel may not retain seamen status under
the Jones Act and general maritime law.

Congress

adopted the ORVA in 1965 to exempt research vessels
from the strict inspection and personnel protection
laws mandated for commercial vessels.
178 Id.

@

960.

179Id.
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The legislative

history, and particularly the hearings before the House
Subcommittee, clearly show that Congress excluded
scientific personnel from consideration as seamen under
Title 53 to avoid the operation of regulations that
were ill-suited to such personnel and unnecessarily
hindered them in their performance of their technical
or scientific functions.

There is no indication,

however, that Congress believed the Jones Act standard
of care or the general obligation to provide a
seaworthy vessel to be so onerous when applied to
scientific personnel as to require the exclusion of
these persons from the range of the laws humanitarian
policy.

See Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki.

This is

amplified by absence of a congressional provision of a
compensation scheme to scientific personnel, and the
failure of the Act to state or imply that scientific
personnel would have the protection of the statutes of
each of the 50 states depending on the happenstance of
where each made his contract of employment. See Sennett
v. Shell Oil
In sum, the Court finds that Congress in enacting
the ORVA did not intend that scientific personnel, any
more than traditional blue water sailors, should be
left without a remedy if injured, or that their
dependents were to be helpless if the injury resulted
in death. See Warner v. Goltra.
61

The Court holds that

scientific personnel on board oceanographic research
vessels, if otherwise entitled to assert seaman status
under the Jones Act and general maritime law, are not
prevented from doing so by the ORVA, but are entitled
to the same remedies available to "all those whose
duties contribute to the operation and welfare of the

Offshore v. Robison

vessel."

180

The defendants appealed the district court's decision, and
the Fifth Circuit became the first Court of Appeals to hear
an ORVA case concerning remedies available to an injured
scientist. 181

The Fifth Circuit upheld the District

Court's finding with respect to the general maritime law but
reversed that part of the opinion related to the Jones Act.
The Appeals Court:
[was] persuaded by Judge Rubin's analysis in Sennett v.

Shell Oil, that the Jones Act either amends or
supplements title 53. 182

Craig v. M/V Peacock 183

180

Id.

@

964, some citations omitted.

181

The Ninth Circuit, held in 1981 in the case of United
States v. Blue Water Marine Industries, 661 F.2d 793, that
ORVs are subject to merchant-vessel manning statutes.
No
scientist injury question was involved.
182

709 F. 2d 406

183

Craig v.

M/V

(5th Cir. 1983).
Peacock,

760

1985).
62

F.2d

953

(Ninth

Circuit

In the year following the Presley decision, the Ninth
Circuit heard the case of Larry Lewis, a scientist who died
when he fell overboard

from the research vessel Peacock

during the course of his employment.

Dianne Craig, Lewis'

wife, filed suit for wrongful death.

At the trial the

parties assumed applicability of the ORVA. 184

As was the

Fifth in Presley, the Ninth Circuit was "persuaded by Judge
Rubin's analysis in Sennett. " 185

The Craig opinion also

cites the Fifth Circuit's Presley decision, but goes much
farther than Presley, relying on its own earlier decision in
the Estate of Wenzel v. Seaward Marine Services, Inc. 1 86 in
holding that scientific personnel are not seamen and
therefore not entitled to benefit from the doctrine of
seaworthiness.

The ruling thereby exonerated the shipowners

in the death of Larry Lewis.

Judge Wisdom, Senior Circuit Judge from the Fifth Circuit
(the author of the Robison decision) , sitting by
designation, issued a lengthy dissent, which begins:
The majority in this case does a serious injustice to
scientific personnel serving on oceanographic research

1 84

Id.

@

955 .

1 85

Id.

@

956.

186

709 F. 2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1983) . A case similar to the
Seventh Circuit's Johnson v. John F. Beasely. One requirement
for a determination of seaman's status is that "the claimant
must be aboard primarily in the aid of navigation."
63

Seamen-scientists serving as members of an

vessels.

ORV crew may, at times be exposed to greater perils of
the sea than are traditional seamen. 187
And adds later:
I would hold that as a _matter of law a member of the
scientific crew of a research vessel is a seaman.
Lewis's widow may have no claim under the Jones Act,
because of a literal reading of ORVA, but she has a
claim under the general maritime law . 188

Judge Wisdom, therefore would hold Presley over the majority
decision in Craig.

His reference to "may have no claim

under the Jones Act, because of a literal reading of the
ORVA"

(emphasis added) seems to imply that he is not

completely supportive of that literal reading, and perhaps
would also agree with Judge Gibson's District Court opinion
in Presley.

Smith v. Odum Offshore Surveys, Inc. 189

Roger Smith was a hydrographic party chief, normally
assigned to a survey vessel, who was killed while working
temporarily ashore.

187

Id.

@

957.

188

Id.

@

961.

The trial court found that Smith was a

189

791 F.2d 411 (5th Circuit 1986);
(M.D. Louisiana 1984)
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588

F.

Supp.

1168

seaman under the Robison criteria.

Defendant's argument

that the ORVA precluded Smith's Jones Act claim was denied
because the vessel had not applied for, nor been designated
by the U.S. Coast Guard as an Ocean Research Vessel, as
required under the ORV Law.

The finding was affirmed by the

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.

Mitola v. Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics
Laboratory, et al 190

Dan Mitola, a twenty year employee of defendant Johns
Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab (JHU/APL) was
assigned to the R/V AMY CHOEST as the Supervisor of Marine
Operations. His responsibilities included deployment and
recovery of towed equipment used in oceanographic research.
Mitola was knocked down and injured by a large wave, while
working on the vessel's back deck.

Mitola brought an action

against his employer, JHU/APL and the vessel's owner Alpha
Marine Services for negligence under the Jones Act, and for
unseaworthiness of the vessel and for maintenance and cure.
Defendants filed for summary judgement which was granted on
all counts.

The court, citing Craig, Presley, and Bennet,

held that:
Even assuming Mitola was a "seaman" under general
maritime law principles, his Jones Act claim is barred

19 0

839 F. Supp. 351 (D.C. Maryland 1993).
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by the Oceanographic Research Vessel Act. 1 9 1
The court found that "the evidence undisputedly establishes
that Mitola was a member of the scientific research team,
not the vessels crew," thereby finding Mitola excluded from
a Jones Act claim as a matter of law.

The court was not

persuaded by Mitola's claim that he was a seaman in
"functional capacity" because his job entailed on-deck
rigging, which involved the operation of cranes and winches,
as well as the handling of lines, cables and shackles,
holding that " the mere performance of such manual duties
fails to transform Mitola into a seaman.

1119 2

Again citing Craig, Presley, and Sennett, the court stated
that:
Although classification as scientific personnel under
ORVA precludes an individual from being considered a
seaman for purposes of the Jones Act, it does not
prevent that individual from being a "seaman" under
general maritime law for other purposes . 193
However, the court also upheld summary judgement for the
defendants on the unseaworthiness claim finding that Mitola
had not offered any evidence that the vessel was
unseaworthy, but merely alleged that the Master's decision
191

Id.

@

354.

1 92

Id.

@

356.

193

Id.

@

357
66

to drive the vessel through a hurricane as "imprudent."
The court found that:
Even assuming the truth of this allegation, a single
negligent act committed by an otherwise competent crew
member cannot render a ship unseaworthy.

This well-

established principle derives from the basic
distinction between liability based upon seaworthiness
and that based upon negligence. 1 94

In Mitola, therefore, we have a 1993 seaman-scientist's
equivalent to Chelentis 1 95 , the landmark 1918 Supreme Court
decision which ultimately led Congress to enact the Jones
Act.

Chelentis, too, was injured by a wave in rough

weather, and similar to the facts in Mitola, because the
vessel was not deemed unseaworthy, he was denied any remedy
beyond maintenance and cure even though his leg was
eventually amputated.

Chandler v. Alpha Marine Services 196

This is a consolidated case initiated by the survivors of
two workers aboard the R/V AMY CHOEST who were killed when
an explosive charge accidentally detonated on deck.

The

1 94

Id. @ 3 5 8. Citing Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp. ,
400 U.S. 494 (1971).
1 95

247 U.S. 372 (1918)

196

Patsy L. Chandler et al v. Alpha Marine Services et al
1994 U.S . Dist LEXIS 5148 (E.D. Louisiana 1994) .
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defendants filed for summary judgement on the grounds that
the plaintiffs were barred by the ORVA from proclaiming
seaman status.

The court granted summary judgement to

defendants only on the Jones Act claim.

The court cited the

Fifth Circuit's Presley decision while holding:
... scientific personnel aboard research vessels can
still maintain an action as seamen against the vessel
under general maritime law for unseaworthiness and a
negligence action under general maritime law against
parties who were not their employers. 197

The court found that the two decedents,

"Sinclair and Burks

were constantly exposed to the perils of the sea. 11198

They

"slept and ate on the vessel and were therefore exposed to
the hazards of the sea 24 hours a day for the entire
voyage. 11199

"Sinclair and Burks exposure to marine perils

was "substantial in point and time and not merely
spasmodic. 11200

197Id.
19sid

@

9.
7.

@

199 Id.
200 Id.

@

8.
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Workmen's compensation cases
Benders v. Board of Governors for Higher Education 2 0 1

Benders was the chief steward aboard the RV ENDEAVOR, a U.S.
Coast Guard designated research vessel, operated by the
University of Rhode Island.

He was injured in 1985, while

the vessel was operating off the coast of Brazil.

In 1986,

Benders entered into a memorandum of agreement with the
State of Rhode Island that was filed with the Workers'
Compensation Court, and he began receiving benefits from the
Rhode Island Employee's Compensation Fund for medical
expenses and lost wages. 202

Benders subsequently initiated

a Jones Act suit in Federal District Court .
$200,000.

He was awarded

The Compensation fund sued for the return of the

$132,000 it had already paid for the injury. The District
Court denied this motion because it had already considered
this amount in establishing the steward's Jones Act award.
Bender sued the Fund in state court to continue payments.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court
ruling that no further payments were owed plaintiff.

Although this case involved a steward who was not barred by
the ORVA from a Jones Act action, and perhaps only
coincidentally took place on a research vessel, the Court's
2 01

636 A.2d 1313

202

Id .

@

(R.I. 1994 )

1314.
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opinion is illustrative of the problems that can arise when
a blue water worker seeks remedy within a state compensation
The Bender Court recognized that the Jones Ac t

system.

provides for recovery for pain and suffering and derivative
claims such as loss of consortium, neither of which are
compensable under R.I. workers' compensation law203 , making
clear that a seaman limited to a workers's compensation
scheme would be at a disadvantage with respect to potential
The Court went on to say:

award.

The interrelation of federal and state law as it
applies to maritime workers is often complex .
Traditionally the law of the sea is federal in nature
and falls under the jurisdiction of the federal
courts . 204
The Court refers to its own earlier recognition of the

Jensen rule where an injured maritime worker was found to be
limited to his federal remedy. 205

Also cited in the Bender

decision is the United States Supreme Court ruling in

Lindgren v. United States 2 0 6

in which the Court concluded:

"that the Jones Act operates uniformly within all of the
States ... and that, as it covers the entire field of

R. I.

203

Id.

® 1315.

20 4

Id .

® 1316.

205

Id.

476
206

@ 1316, citing Duffy v.
(1929)

281 U.S.

38

(1930).
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Providence Teaming Co . , 49

liability for injuries to seamen, it is paramount and
exclusive, and supersedes the operation of all state
statutes dealing with that subject."

The Rhode Island Court recognizes that in certain
circumstances the courts have modified the Jensen and

Lindgren rules, in order to avoid "the harsh result of
uncovered or undercovered workers", but that these
modifications are normally acceptable only when a maritime
matter such as an injury to a seaman is deemed to be of
"purely local concern. " 207

The Court held that "Benders

was not engaged in essentially 'local' activities when he
was injured" and therefore"· .. this is not a case wherein
the injured worker falls within a so-called twilight zone
between federal and state recovery and would have no remedy
for his injury. " 208

However, had Bender been a member of the scientific party on
that same vessel, the R.I. Supreme Court might very well
have been dealing with an injured worker who was within a
"twilight zone" of coverage. 209

207

Bender v.
supra@ 1317.

209

Board of

Governors

for

See Discussion, Section VI infra.
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Higher Education,

Decourt v. Beckman Instruments, Inc. 210

William A. Decourt was a technician employed by respondent
Beckman Instruments, Inc. with responsibility to perform
tests on developmental diving equipment from the decks of
the research vessel EL TORITO and the EL TORITO's skiff. 211
Decourt was drowned during the course of his employment.
The California Appellate Court reversed the trial court's
finding that the California Industrial Accident Commission
had jurisdiction over the accident.

The Appeals Court

relied heavily on the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in London
Co. v. Industrial Corrunission 212 and the California Supreme

Court's decision in Occidental Indemnity Co. v. Industrial
Accident Corrunission 213 , while finding that the state

compensation court was not competent to make an award for
damages in a maritime case.

In London Co. the Supreme Court held that:
A seaman's injury or death on navigable waters can
never be a local matter within local jurisdiction.

210

32 Cal. App. 3d 628,

(C.A.Cal., 4th App. Dist., Div. 1

1973) .
211

The court records do not indicate if the EL TORITO was
designated by the U.S. Coast Guard as an ORV. Applicability
of the ORVA did not surface in the case, and Decourt was
deemed to be a Jones Act seaman.
212

279 U.S. 109 (1930); An appeal of a California case.

213

24 Cal. 2d 310 ( 1944) .
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Application of a state workmen's compensation act to a
claim ... having no features other than those
characteristically maritime, is a violation of the
exclusive maritime jurisdiction.
and
The state compensation act cannot be made applicable to
an accident in which the employee was a
seaman . .. without affecting or impinging upon the
admiralty jurisdiction to an extent heretofore never
permitted by this

Court. 2 ~

In Occidental Indemnity, the California Supreme Court
reversed and nullified an award by the Industrial Accident
Commission for lack of jurisdiction, even after the
Commission specifically found that the claimant was not a
seaman.

In the Decourt case, the majority held:

The rights and duties involved in the Jones Act remedy
differ from those under the state compensation act both
in the i r source under the Constitution of the United
States and in their nature as developed by the federal
cases.

The issues determinative of jurisdiction under

the Jones Act are thus far different from those
determinative of jurisdiction under the state
compensation law. 215

214

279 U.S. 109,122.

215

32 Cal. App . 3d 628, 635.
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It can thus be seen that circumstances could arise in which
a scientist could be barred from a Jones Act suit by the
ORVA, and yet still be beyond the jurisdiction of the state
workers' compensation system of one or more of the 50
States .

VI. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

The thesis of this paper is that a scientist injured on a
research vessel is at a serious disadvantage with respect to
available remedies when compared to all other "seamen" -even a co-worker, on the same vessel, perhaps injured in the
same accident, if the co-worker is classified as a "nonscientist," or more "traditional" crewmember.

This inequity

arises as a result of the ambiguous wording of Section 4 of
the Ocean Research Vessel Act of 1965, and subsequent
literal interpretation by several courts, which found that
Congress intended to specifically deny scientists the
statutory remedy afforded all other seamen under the Jones
Act.

The above sections have attempted to show that:

(1)

The legislative history clearly indicates that Congress
never intended such a result; and (2) Exclusion of
scientists, who face the perils of the sea to the same
degree as all other blue water seamen, is directly in
conflict with trends of both Congress and the Courts with
74

respect to providing beneficial remedies for workers who
face such hazards.

The paper has outlined two basic policy considerations with
respect to remedies afforded injured maritime workers:
(1) The beneficial remedies for seamen are extended to all
those who regularly face the hazards of the sea in the
course of their employment; and (2) Alternative remedies are
afforded all others, such as longshoremen and maritime
workers.

It is clear that both the Courts 216 and

Congress 217 recognize that scientists on research vessels
are, in the course of their employment, exposed to the same
hazards as "traditional" seamen.

Scientists have not been

granted any alternative remedy for injury, in compensation
for the remedies denied them by court interpretation of the
ORVA,

"although Congress clearly had the power to do

so. " 218

It is illogical that the Fifth Circuit, the same

court which handed down the Robison decision, extending
"seaman's status", could also have held in Presley, that an
injured scientist was barred from "seaman status" for Jones
Act applicability.

That same Court

also held in Wallace v.

Oceaneering International that:
[I]n ambiguous cases, our analysis again and again has
216

See supra Section V.

217

See supra Section IV.

218

See supra p.

[30], Sennett v. Shell Oil Co.
75

focused on (1) the degree of exposure to the hazards or
perils of the sea, and (2) the maritime or terra firma
nature of the workers duties.
[and]
[T]he seaman status of Wallace is established by his
exposure to maritime perils with regularity and
continuity, and the maritime nature of his primary
duti~s.

219

There can be no doubt, that except for interpretation of
Section 4 of the ORVA, scientific personnel on research
vessels would be afforded by the courts all of the remedies
available to seamen, if they otherwise qualify for such
status under the new two prong test established this year in
Chandris v. Latsis. 220

The only policy justification which can be imagined
supporting exclusion of oceanographic personal from the
beneficial remedies of the Jones Act would be to limit their
employer's liability.

However, as Judge Gibson pointed out

in his Presley decision, there is no reference to such a
goal in the legislative history. 221

Additionally, in his

concurring opinion in Chandris v. Latsis, Justice Stevens
unequivocally points out that the Jones Act was enacted to
219

727 F.2d@ 434.

22 0

1995 U.S. LEXIS 4047

221

See supra note 1 79.
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protect workers exposed to the perils of the sea, not "as a
scheme to protect employers . " 222

The Fifth Circuit, in its Presley decision, relied too
heavily on the literal interpretation of the Sennett Court .
They should have let Judge Gibson's holding in Presley
stand. 223

His was a more thorough analysis of the ORVA

legislative history than that in Sennett. Gibson correctly
determined that Congress did not intend to deny scientists
the beneficial remedy of the Jones Act, and in the opinion
of this author, was the only court to correctly interpret
the ORVA .

Judge Wisdom's dissent in Craig2 2 4 also appears

to indicate his dissatisfaction with the literal
interpretation of the Sennett analysis.

The hazards faced by scientists on research vessels does not
seem to be in question.

The accidental deaths of Albert

Sennett, Larry Lewis (Craig v. M/V PEACOCK), and Lee Roy
Burks and Burney Sinclair (Chandler v. Alpha Marine
Services) underscore this fact.

It is therefore contrary to

the general policy which provides beneficial remedies to
injured seamen, to deny an individual class of blue-water
seamen some (potentially all) of those remedies.

Although

222

1995 U.S. LEXIS @ *70, J.Stevens concurring.

223

See supra p.

22 4

See supra p. [3 5] .

[33).
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injured scientists have in some jurisdictions been able to
maintain actions under the general maritime law, other
courts have denied this avenue of relief as well, 225
thereby reopening a "twilight zone" where an injured
maritime worker is forced to straddle the remedies available
under the federal maritime law and state workers'
compensation systems.

Clearly this is a huge step into the past.

In 1942, the

Supreme Court recognized the concept of a "twilight zone"
with respect to coverage for injured land based maritime
workers covered under the LHWCA. 226
In determining whether state law or the LHWCA applied
to the injuries to land-based maritime workers, the
Court recognized that no clear line existed to
determine which compensation regime ruled but rather
that a twilight zone existed wherein a case-by-case
determination needed to be made about whether the state
or the federal remedy would compensate a worker. 227
The Court later recognized the amendments to the LHWCA and
225

See supra Section V: Castro v. Vessel LAFAYETTE, Civil
Action No. 76-H755
(S.D. Texas, Houston Division, Slip
Opinion, March 2, 1978); Craig v. M/V PEACOCK, 760 F.2d 953
(9th Cir. 1985).
226

Davis v.

Dept.

of Labor and Industries,

317 U.S.

49

(1942).
227

Benders v. Board of Education, 636 A.2d 1313,1317 (R.I.
19 94) , citing Davis v. Dept. of Labor and Industries of
Washington, 317 U.S. 49 (1942).
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for the most part the "twilight zone" has been closed.
However,

"neither Congress nor the Court has ever abrogated

Jensen as it relates to seamen covered under the Jones
Act.

1122 0

It is possible, even likely, that a new and more dangerous
"twilight zone" has been created with rulings barring
scientists from Jones Act coverage.
case of Mi tola v . JHU/APL 22 9 •

Take, for example, the

Dan Mitola was injured on a

vessel found to be seaworthy, but was denied a Jones Act
suit under Section 4 of ORVA .

Mitola's only other remedy

would therefore seem to lie within a state workers'
compensation scheme.

But , had Mitola's employment contract

been based in California, he might have been denied an award
by the Industrial Accident Commission under the decision in
Occidental Indemnity Co., which held that the state

compensation court is not competent to make an award for
damages in a maritime case. 230
maritime.

The Mi tola case is clearly

Even though he was denied a Jones Act suit as a

matter of law, he was still entitled to an unseaworthiness
action.

But, as in this case, if the vessel is found to be

seaworthy, would Mitola then be able to receive benefits
payable under a state compensation system?

Would the answer

228

Id.

229

839 F. Supp. 351 (D.C. Maryland 1993 ) .

230

See supra p. [40], 24 Cal. 2d 310 (1944)

@

1317.
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be the same in all of the fifty States?

The record does not indicate precisely how much of his
working time Mitola spent aboard ship, therefore it is not
possible to speculate whether he would have satisfied the
"approximately 30 percent" of work time requirement laid out
in the 1995 Chandris decision.

There is no doubt however

that there are oceanographic personnel, both scientists and
technicians, who do meet the Chandris test.

Any of these

workers could have an accident with circumstances similar to
Mitola, and potentially be denied all of the beneficial
remedies intended to protect maritime workers who regularly
are exposed to the perils of the sea.

The Sennett Court itself stated :
It would be a strange result if one who labors on the
high seas may recover against his employer only under
state compensation laws for an industrial accident. 231
But this is exactly the result, in cases such as Mitola's
where seaman status under the general maritime law is
maintained, but the vessel is determined to be seaworthy,
and also in cases in circuits such as the Ninth, where
Section 4 of the ORVA is held to preclude all seaman's
actions, including those under the general maritime law .

23 1

3 2 5 F. Supp. 1, 3 .
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This brings rise the question of consistency and uniformity
of the federal maritime law.

The Sennett Court was very

concerned with the uniformity of the maritime law .

In spite

of the fact that the Court's interpretation of the ORVA
resulted in denial of a scientist's seaman status under the
Jones Act, in support of its holding that the ORVA did
nothing to alter a scientist's right to seaman status under
the general maritime law, the Court quoted a lengthy passage
from the Supreme Court's 1970 decision in Moragne v. States
Marine Lines. 232

Moragne, decided only the year before

Sennett, overruled the Harrisburg while finding a wrongful
death action within the general maritime law.

The Supreme

Court stated:
The existence of a maritime remedy for deaths of seamen
in territorial waters will further, rather than hinder,
"uniformity in the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction";
and
The Court's ruling in Gillespie 233 was only that the
Jones Act, which was intended to bring about the
uniformity in the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction
required by the Constitution

* * * necessarily

supersedes the application of the death statutes of the

232

398 U.S. 375 (1970)

233

Ci ting Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp. , 3 79 U.S.
148 (1964).
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several States. 23 4

It is therefore extremely unfortunate that the Sennet Court,
so concerned with the uniformity of the federal maritime
law, through a literal interpretation of the ORVA and a
faulty review of the legislative history, set the precedent
by which that uniformity has been seriously compromised.
Uniformity is currently compromised in several ways.
Scientists have seamen's rights under the maritime law in
some circuits but are denied them in others.

Additionally,

injured scientists are likely to be forced into one of fifty
separate and different state workers' compensation systems - seeking relief under laws that never contemplated maritime
injuries.

The nation's policy of maintaining a uniform

maritime law, as well as equitable considerations for
injured scientists, speak strongly for a reevaluation of the
current state of the law, with regard to interpretation and
application of the ORVA .

In addition to the Jones Act remedies and those contained
within the maritime law which may be unavailable to an
injured scientist,

he also is denied access to a jury

trial, which is provided for in the Jones Act, but not

234

Sennett v. Shell Oil Co.,
Moragne v . States Marine Lines .
82

325 F .

Supp.

1, 7;

citing

otherwise guaranteed in Admiralty by the Federal maritime
law .

Again, no policy justification has been made for this

exclusion.

The determination of "seaman status'' is a mixed

question of law and fact.

There is no reason why scientists

should be denied a jury hearing their "seaman status" claim
as a matter of law under the ORVA decisions.

In Chandris v.

Latsis the Supreme Court held that:

The jury should be permitted, when determining whether
a maritime employee has the requisite employmentrelated connection to a vessel in navigation to qualify
as a member of the vessel's crew , to consider all
relevant circumstances ...

". ~ 5

An injured scientist should have this right as do all other
blue-water sailors .

VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This paper has described the inequitable situation which
exists with respect to remedies available to scientists
injured aboard research vessels.

This inequity is

attributed to faulty Court analysis of the legislative
history of the Ocean Research Vessel Act of 1965.

The paper

does not argue that Congress could not have denied
scientists seaman status under the Jones Act.
235

1995 U.S. LEXIS 4047, *42.
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It clearly

had the power to do so.

In upholding the constitutionality

of the Jones Act, the Supreme Court held that Congress is
empowered to add to the maritime law. 236

Certainly if

Congress was able to enact the Jones Act it was authorized
to limit its applicability.

This paper has presented

evidence which indicates that Congress, in enacting the
ORVA, never contemplated such a result.

The Supreme Court

has also held that the desire for uniformity is insufficient
to override federal statute. 237

However, this paper has

argued that uniformity of the maritime law has been
compromised, but not out of Congressional intent.

The

thesis of this paper is that regular exposure to the "perils
of the sea 11 is the foundation of Jones Act coverage 238 ,

and

therefore scientists should be afforded that coverage as are
all other seamen.

As discussed in the preface, this paper was substantially
complete before the Supreme Court's ruling earlier this year
in Chandris v. La ts is. 23 9

The Chandris rule which now

requires that an employee spend 30 percent, more or less, of
his working time at sea in order to be classified as a ship236

Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375

(1924) .

237

Sims supra @ 1008, citing Mobil Oil v. Higgenbotham,
436 U.S . 618 (1978).
238

Robertson supra @ 96, citing Mungia v. Chevron Co. 675
F . 2d 630 (5th Circuit 1982) (quoting Robison, 266 F.2d @ 771).
239

19 9 5 U . S . LEX IS 4 0 4 7
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based (as opposed to land based) maritime worker entitled to
"seaman status" would likely disqualify many scientific
personnel from such a determination.

However, this new

temporal test for seaman status only makes the existing
inequity even greater for those oceanographic personnel who
would otherwise qualify for "seaman status", but will be
denied this valued status according to interpretation of
Section 4 of the ORVA.

An interpretation which has been

shown to be misplaced.

The paper has pointed out that no policy justification can
be shown for the interpretation of section 4 which denies
scientific personnel the beneficial remedies of the Jones
Act and the general maritime law despite their regular
exposure to the perils of the sea which would otherwise
qualify them for seaman status.

In light of the Supreme

Court's "seaman status" test outlined in its Wilander/

Chandris decisions, it is now even more imperative that the
inequity be addressed, for the benefit of the injured
scientists who may be denied appropriate remedies, and for
the purpose of maintaining the consistency of the federal
maritime law.

Some commentators have argued that the Jones Act itself may
be unnecessary today, and that a workmen's compensation type

85

approach would be more useful. 240

That question is beyond

the scope of this paper, which is concerned with the
inequity of denying beneficial remedies to only one small
class of blue-water workers.

However, studies do indicate

that seafaring remains substantially more dangerous than
most shorebased occupations. 241

The present inequity may be rectified by either the Congress
or the Supreme Court.

The Court might accept certiorari of

an ORVA case in order to end the inconsistency which
currently exists in the lower courts.

However, having so

recently created its two prong seaman status test with the
it is unlikely that the Court

Wilander/ Chandris decisions,

will chose to review another "seaman status" case in the
near future.

Particularly one with such a narrow focus,

pertaining only to scientist seamen.

Congress could also seek to remedy the inequity caused by
the misinterpretation of its 1965 Act.

This author believes

that Congressional action, amending the ORVA, is not only
the more likely solution, but the preferred one as well.

A

240

See
Schoenbaum
supra @
181
and Nixon,
Recent
developments in U.S.
commercial Fishing vessel safety,
insurance and law. 17 J.Mar. Com. Law No . 3:359, July, 1986.
241

Barss, Monaghan, and Hall, A review of injuries and
illnesses aboard research vessels of the Universitv National
Oceanographic System. Unpublished study funded by the National
Science Foundation, August, 1988.
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rewording could clarify that Section 4's

original reference

to Title 53 of the Revised Statutes referred only to manning
regulations and requirements for merchant seaman's
documents, and that scientists, because of the hazards they
face, are to be considered "seamen" entitled to all
beneficial remedies afforded other seamen exposed to the
"perils of the sea."

Congress can, and should, address this

issue to right the serious injustice which has been done to
scientific personnel who serve on oceanographic research
vessels. 242

242

Paraphrasing Judge Wisdom's dissent in Craig v . M/V
Peacock 760 F.2d @ 957 (1985).
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